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INTEREST OF AMICI 
 Amici Douglas Laycock, Mark Gergen, and Doug 
Rendleman teach and write about the law of 
Remedies, including equitable defenses.1 Individual 
amici are further described in the Appendix. Amici’s 
interest in this case is to clarify a set of doctrines that 
has been the subject of considerable confusion. With 
both parties and the courts below taking all-or-
nothing positions, bad facts could easily make bad 
law. We do not undertake to evaluate the facts or 
resolve the dispute, but the appropriate solution is 
most likely somewhere between the positions of the 
parties. 
 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 I. The separate-accrual rule is well-settled and 
sound. It prohibits recovery of all damages to plaintiff 
or profits to defendant from sales of infringing works 
more than three years before the date the complaint 
was filed. This rule fully protects MGM’s reliance 
interests with respect to those sales. 
 II. In some separate-accrual cases, there is 
substantial and legitimate reliance not protected by 
the separate-accrual rule. A defendant may slowly 
build up the value of an asset over many years. Or a 
defendant may make a large and risky investment 
just outside the limitations period, with the payoff 
                                                 
1 No attorney for either party wrote any part of this brief. No 
person other than amici helped pay for it. Letters consenting to 
this brief are on file with the Clerk. Amici file this brief in their 
individual capacities as scholars; their universities take no 




coming within the limitations period. No interpre-
tation of the statute of limitations can deal with such 
cases. Courts must bring to bear a doctrine that takes 
account of defendant’s reliance — either laches or 
estoppel. 
 Laches and estoppel protect reliance, and they 
should bar a claim only to the extent necessary to 
protect reliance. Laches or estoppel may therefore bar 
recovery of profits from a recent investment without 
barring an injunction against future uses of the 
infringing work. The choice is not all-or-nothing. 
 The facts concerning MGM’s alleged reliance are 
undeveloped, but that reliance does not appear to be 
sufficient to bar all relief for Petitioner. MGM’s 
reliance appears to consist of a series of incremental 
investments, most of which are fully protected by the 
separate-accrual rule, and none of which were a large-
scale gamble. But we take no position on the 
sufficiency of MGM’s evidence or any other factual 
issue in this case.  
 Congress’s failure to mention laches in the 
Copyright Act should not be read to make the 
principle inapplicable. No statute could be imple-
mented without reliance on background principles of 
judge-made law, and congressional silence should not 
be read to make such principles inapplicable. The 
Copyright Act contains a statute of limitations, but it 
does not mention either the separate-accrual rule on 
which Petitioner relies or the laches rule on which 
Respondent relies. Both should be available here.  
 A stray reference to “estoppel” in the legislative 
history does not indicate otherwise. That sentence 




were not recommending; it was not explaining the bill 
that was enacted. 
 Laches or estoppel should apply to all remedies 
under the Copyright Act, without distinguishing legal 
remedies from equitable remedies. Either kind of 
remedy may, on occasion, be devastating to legitimate 
reliance interests. Estoppel is clearly available at law 
as well as in equity, and with respect to unreasonably 
delayed claims, its content is little different from that 
of laches. Alternatively, laches could be extended to 
legal claims in this context, as most other equitable 
defenses have been extended. 
 III. eBay v. MercExchange casts no light on this 
case. Its four-part test for injunctions was not 
intended to include all the issues relevant to the grant 
or denial of an injunction. Most obviously, it does not 
mention the elements of plaintiff’s claim on the 
merits, and it does not mention affirmative defenses. 
If laches were precluded by eBay’s failure to mention 
it, the doctrine would be repealed in all injunction 
cases. 
 eBay’s formulation of the law of injunctions is not 
quite right, and it has had large unintended 
consequences. eBay confused preliminary and 
permanent injunctions, even though the elements of 
the four-part test are fundamentally affected by 
whether plaintiff has proved his case.  
 The lower courts have read eBay to prohibit any 
presumptions concerning when injunctions are 
available or unavailable. Such presumptions were 
already well established in Justice Story’s time; they 
are essential parts of the “traditional principles of 




consequence of sweeping away a vast body of judicial 
experience. eBay need not be reconsidered in this case, 




I. This Case Should Not Call into Question the 
Separate-Accrual Rule. 
 The Court should not question the premise that 
underlies the Question Presented — that the statute 
of limitations has not run for infringing copies and 
sales after May 22, 2006. That is the date three years 
before the complaint was filed. This separate-accrual 
rule is both well-settled and sound.2  
 The separate-accrual rule reconciles the 
conflicting interests of both sides with the policy of the 
statute of limitations. Plaintiffs can recover for new or 
continuing violations within the limitations period, 
but such violations do not allow plaintiffs to recover 
for earlier violations outside the limitations period. 
Continuing harm from past violations is not enough; 
there must be new violations, which cause new harm, 
within the limitations period. Delay in filing suit thus 
has substantial consequences. Petitioner here has lost 
any right to complain of infringing sales from 1980 to 
2006. She cannot recover her own damages, statutory 
                                                 
2 See, e.g., Bay Area Laundry & Dry Cleaning Pension Trust 
Fund v. Ferbar Corp., 522 U.S. 192, 208-10 (1997); Klehr v. A.O. 
Smith Corp., 521 U.S. 179, 189-90 (1997); Zenith Radio Corp. v. 
Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 338 (1971); Hanover Shoe, 
Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 502 n.15 




damages, or MGM’s profits for those sales, and it is 
now impossible to enjoin those sales. 
 More important, the separate-accrual rule protects 
MGM’s reliance with respect to all sales prior to May 
22, 2006. But under the separate-accrual rule, 
Petitioner’s delay does not grant MGM a de facto 
perpetual license. Petitioner can still sue for 
infringements within the three-year period of 
limitations, and she can still sue for an injunction for 
the future. 
 The separate-accrual rule worked exactly as we 
have described it, in the face of much greater delay, in 
Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 
392 U.S. 481, 502 n.15 (1968). The plaintiff there sued 
in 1955 to challenge an allegedly monopolistic practice 
that had been in effect since 1912. The statute had run 
on all applications of that practice from 1912 to 1951, 
but the statute had not run on continued applications 
of the practice after 1951. Defendant could not acquire 
a perpetual license to monopolize simply because no 
one sued during World War I; neither could plaintiff 
recover damages back to 1912. The four-year statute 
was given full effect by limiting plaintiff’s claim to 
those damages caused by defendant’s practice in the 
last four years before the complaint was filed, and to 
an injunction for the future. 
 When the principal remedy at issue in a separate-
accrual case is damages, the Court appropriately 
emphasizes that defendants’ wrongful acts within the 
limitations period must have caused new damage to 
the plaintiff. See Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 521 U.S. 
179, 190 (1997) (plaintiffs “have not shown how any 
new act could have caused them harm over and above 




392 U.S. at 502 n.15 (“continuing and accumulating 
harm”). 
 This principle is sound, but it must be generalized 
to take account of the remedies available for the 
violation at issue. It is more likely that new infringing 
sales of the movie after 2006 earned profits for MGM 
than that they caused damages to Petitioner. The 
separate-accrual rule permits recovery of defendant’s 
profits from infringing sales within three years of the 
complaint. 
 Because plaintiffs’ damages and defendants’ 
profits are often difficult to calculate in copyright 
cases, Congress has also provided a statutory 
damages remedy. 17 U.S.C. §504(c) (2006 & Supp. V 
2011). These statutory damages should also be 
recoverable for infringing sales within three years of 
the filing of the complaint, provided that the plaintiff 
shows that there were some new actual damages or 
some new profits from violations within the 
limitations period.  
  Statutory damages are a substitute for the actual 
damages or profits that should plainly be recoverable; 
for the statutory plan to work, the substitute must 
also be recoverable. But if, as in Klehr, it is clear that 
any violations within the limitations period caused no 
new damages and earned defendants no new profits, 
the availability of statutory damages without proof 
should not in itself prevent the running of the 
limitations period. That issue might arise under some 
other statute providing for statutory damages, but it 
is quite unlikely to arise under the Copyright Act. A 




always gains, at least the market value of what was 
taken — the value of a license for the infringing use.3  
II. Laches and Estoppel Protect Substantial and 
Legitimate Reliance Not Protected by the 
Separate-Accrual Rule. 
A. In Some Separate-Accrual Cases, Sub-
stantial and Legitimate Reliance Is Not 
Fully Protected by the Separate-Accrual 
Rule Alone. 
 The separate-accrual rule generally works quite 
well, protecting the legitimate interests of both sides. 
But occasionally, the separate-accrual rule fails to 
protect substantial reliance on a plaintiff’s apparent 
acquiescence. 
 The separate-accrual rule may fail to protect 
reliance that is long lasting and cumulative, a 
problem that is especially likely to arise in trademark 
cases. Consider NAACP v. NAACP Legal Defense & 
Educational Fund, Inc., 753 F.2d 131 (D.C. Cir. 1985), 
in which the Defense Fund had operated under the 
same name since 1936, raising money under that 
name, litigating cases under that name, and generally 
building up the value of its name. But the Defense 
Fund and the NAACP had become wholly separate 
organizations in 1957. Eventually, but not until 1982, 
the NAACP sued the Defense Fund for an injunction 
ordering the Defense Fund to drop “NAACP” from its 
                                                 
3 See, e.g., Davis v. The Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 161-72 (2d 
Cir. 2001); Deltak, Inc. v. Advanced Systems, Inc., 767 F.2d 357, 
361-64 (7th Cir. 1985);  Restatement (Third) of Restitution and 
Unjust Enrichment §42 cmt. f (2011) (explaining why market 





name. Under the separate-accrual rule, the statute of 
limitations had not run and would never run. But the 
court held the claim barred by laches; there was no 
other way to protect the Defense Fund’s reliance on 
the NAACP’s long acquiescence.  
 Or the separate-accrual rule may fail to protect 
reliance reflected in investments that can be recouped 
only from profits earned within the limitations period 
or beyond. This issue is more likely to arise in 
copyright cases. Suppose that in 2005, just outside the 
three-year limitations period, MGM had produced a 
remake of the original movie, spending $50 or $100 
million on a new production that might have been a 
blockbuster hit, a total flop, or anything in between. 
That would undoubtedly be reliance that deserves 
protection. A plaintiff who had unreasonably delayed 
filing suit while such a movie was made should not be 
allowed to obtain either a judgment for all the profits 
or an injunction barring further distribution of the 
movie.  
 No interpretation of the statute of limitations can 
deal with this hypothetical or with the NAACP case. 
The separate-accrual rule taken alone would allow 
suit at any time despite such reliance. Abolishing the 
separate-accrual rule would eliminate suits in cases of 
continuing or repeated violations even if there were no 
reliance whatever. An outright pirate without the 
slightest belief that he had rights to the work could 
infringe forever if he avoided suit for the first three 
years. So could an infringer who sold copies out of 
inventory, or printed copies on demand, and made no 
investments in the work. Only an equitable doctrine 
such as laches or estoppel can reach sensible results 




 Finally, to complete the picture on this point: 
There are contexts in which any claimed reliance is 
illegitimate and not deserving of protection. Courts 
have properly refused to protect claimed reliance by 
infringers who have no plausible or good-faith belief 
that they have a right to the work. See Danjaq LLC v. 
Sony Corp., 263 F.3d 942, 956-58 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(collecting authorities). Such an infringer is not 
relying on the plaintiff’s longtime failure to assert a 
claim so much as on a hope, from the very beginning, 
that he could get away with it. Courts have also 
explained this rule on the ground that an infringer 
with unclean hands cannot invoke the equitable 
defense of laches. Id. at 956. 
B. The Reliance Claim in This Case Is 
Dubious, but We Take No Position on Its 
Sufficiency. 
 Much of MGM’s reliance in this case is already 
protected by the separate-accrual rule. The rest pales 
in comparison to the reliance of the Defense Fund, or 
to the reliance in the hypothetical remake of the 
movie. MGM’s repeated distribution of the movie 
through new media, through new distribution 
channels, and with new promotions appears to have 
involved modest incremental expenditures with 
reasonable prospects for profit on each effort and with 
limited potential losses. 
 We are told that MGM spent $8.5 million during 
the eighteen-year period of delay, Pet. App. 13a, but 
we are told very little about when these expenditures 
were made. MGM made one investment of $100,000 
within the limitations period, and it invested 
$3,000,000 in 2004 and 2005 to produce an 




familiar with the entire record, but we are aware of no 
information about the extent to which this 
anniversary investment depended on potential sales 
within the limitations period — after May 22, 2006. 
And it is clear that the court of appeals made no such 
distinctions. See Pet. App. 12a-14a. 
 To the extent that MGM’s investments produced 
sales before May 2006, including sales of the 
anniversary edition in 2005 and early 2006, its 
reliance is fully protected by the separate-accrual 
rule. Unless MGM can show that all its expenditures 
cumulatively and continuously built up the value of 
the movie as an asset, as in the NAACP case, only the 
reliance that produced sales within the limitations 
period is relevant. 
 Moreover, substantial protection for this relevant 
reliance is built into the measure of MGM’s profits. 
MGM is liable only for net profits; it is entitled to 
prove, and get full credit for, its “deductible expenses 
and the elements of profit attributable to factors other 
than the copyrighted work.” 17 U.S.C. §504(b) (2006). 
Restitution of a wrongdoer’s profits, in copyright as 
elsewhere, is limited to “the net profit attributable to 
the underlying wrong,” and “[t]he object of restitution 
in such cases is to eliminate profit from wrongdoing 
while avoiding, so far as possible, the imposition of a 
penalty.”4 
 Calculation of net profits does not entirely solve 
the reliance problem, in part because difficulties of 
proof sometimes result in defendants getting less than 
                                                 
4 Restatement (Third), supra note 3, §51(4). The difficulties of 





full credit for their contributions. And a plaintiff who 
knowingly stands by to await the outcome of a large 
speculative investment, like the hypothetical 
production and release of a new movie, should be 
barred by laches even if the net profits can be perfectly 
calculated. Cf. Twin-Lick Oil Co. v. Marbury, 91 U.S. 
(1 Otto) 587, 592 (1875) (“No delay for the purpose of 
enabling the defrauded party to speculate upon the 
chances which the future may give him of deciding 
profitably to himself whether he will abide by his 
bargain, or rescind it, is allowed in a court of equity.”). 
There is some indication that Petitioner waited until 
MGM had profits to sue for, but we have seen no 
indication that she deliberately speculated on the 
outcome of one risky investment. 
 MGM was not unaware; it knew of Petitioner’s 
claim as soon as she did, and quite possibly sooner. 
Pet. App. 9a; J.A. 128. MGM relied on its own view of 
the matter and on Petitioner’s failure to press the 
claim, and it relied incrementally. Petitioner waited 
an extremely long time for not very good reasons. 
Without access to the record, and with MGM’s 
evidence directed to an all-or-nothing choice without 
attention to the question of how much of its reliance 
is not already protected by other rules, we have not 
undertaken to resolve issues that depend on the facts 
of this case. The essential points are that the lower 
courts should have examined MGM’s claimed reliance 
much more closely than they did, that the timing of 
reliance goes far to determine its relevance, and that 
the magnitude of the relevant reliance matters. 
 The magnitude of reliance matters because the 
laches defense has the potential to transfer all rights 




not be based on modest reliance amounting to a small 
fraction of the value of the work.  
 Nor does the choice have to be all or nothing. 
“Because laches is based on prejudice to the 
defendant, the bar it raises should be no broader than 
the prejudice shown.”5 It may or may not make sense 
to say that Petitioner’s claim to the profits from sales 
of the 2005 anniversary edition is barred by laches, 
but it almost certainly does not make sense to say that 
Petitioner’s claim to an injunction with respect to all 
potential future uses of the work is barred by the 
reliance reflected in that one rather modest 
investment.  
 The Court long ago took note of this solution in a 
trademark case. “Cases frequently arise where a court 
of equity will refuse the prayer of the complainant for 
an account of gains and profits, on the ground of delay 
in asserting his rights, even when the facts proved 
render it proper to grant an injunction to prevent 
future infringement.” McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. (6 
Otto) 245, 257 (1877). This solution is even more 
appropriate in copyright, where the facts of cases are 
far less likely to involve name recognition achieved 
slowly and cumulatively over many years. 
  
                                                 





C. Congressional Silence Should Not Be 
Taken to Repeal Background Principles of 
Common Law or Equity. 
  1. Statutory Text 
 Congress did not mention laches or estoppel in the 
Copyright Act. That should not be taken as an implied 
repeal of these longstanding principles. 
 No statute could be implemented without reliance 
on background principles of judge-made law. The 
Copyright Act is no exception. It provides for recovery 
of plaintiff’s damages or defendant’s profits, but it 
says very little about how to measure or calculate 
those damages or profits. It provides for injunctions 
but states no rules for granting or refusing 
injunctions. Congress does not have to codify all these 
background principles every time it enacts a statute, 
and it could not conceivably do so if it tried. 
 Both the Copyright Act and the Patent Act say that 
injunctions are to be granted on terms the court deems 
“reasonable.” The Patent Act, but not the Copyright 
Act, also says that any injunction shall be granted “in 
accordance with the principles of equity.” Compare 17 
U.S.C. §502 (2006), with 35 U.S.C. §283 (2006). This 
contrast hardly means that “the principles of equity” 
are irrelevant to injunctions under the Copyright Act. 
 The Copyright Act includes a statute of 
limitations, but it does not mention the separate-
accrual rule on which Petitioner relies any more than 
it mentions the laches rule on which Respondent 
relies. The Act mentions no rules for tolling its statute 
of limitations. The committee reports mention some 
but not all of the common tolling rules, and say that it 




district courts, generally, recognize these equitable 
defenses anyway.” S. Rep. 85-1014, at 3 (quoting H.R. 
Rep. 85-150, at 2).6  
 Many federal statutes enacted before 1990 have no 
statute of limitations at all, but the Court has not 
interpreted congressional silence to mean that there 
is no limitations period. The Court has generally 
looked instead to the most nearly analogous state 
statute of limitations, and sometimes to an analogous 
federal statute of limitations, but Congress never said 
either of those things. “The implied absorption of 
State statutes of limitation within the interstices of 
the federal enactments is a phase of fashioning 
remedial details where Congress has not spoken but 
left matters for judicial determination within the 
general framework of familiar legal principles.” 
Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946). 
 The same could be said for any other judge-made 
remedial rule that Congress has neither codified, 
modified, nor repealed. Borrowing a state statute of 
limitations — a legislative enactment on an issue that 
had always been legislative — was a much bolder 
judicial innovation than applying a well-known judge-
made doctrine such as laches or estoppel to an issue 
that legislators have generally left to judges. 
 When Congress says nothing about a judge-made 
rule such as laches, the most reasonable inference is 
that it did not address laches one way or the other and 
that it was not thinking about laches. If Congress were 
thinking about laches and if it meant to exclude laches 
by silence, it would have been very easy and far more 
effective to say in the statutory text, “Laches shall not 
                                                 




be a defense to actions under this title.” There is no 
reason to read such a legislative bar into 
congressional silence. 
 Congress can amend or repeal such well-settled 
principles if it chooses, but not by merely failing to 
mention them. “Of course, Congress may intervene 
and guide or control the exercise of the court’s 
discretion, but we do not lightly assume that Congress 
has intended to depart from established principles.” 
Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 313 
(1982). “The great principles of equity, securing 
complete justice, should not be yielded to light 
inferences, or doubtful construction.” Brown v. 
Swann, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 497, 503 (1836). 
 This Court has held that a statute providing that 
an injunction “shall be granted” did not abolish 
equitable discretion to refuse an injunction in 
appropriate cases, even where multiple violations of 
the law had been proved. “We cannot but think that if 
Congress had intended to make such a drastic 
departure from the traditions of equity practice, an 
unequivocal statement of its purpose would have been 
made.” Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944). 
See also BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 
543 (1994) (stating more generally that congressional 
departures from long-existing rules should not be 
inferred without “clearer textual guidance” than the 
statutory phrase at issue there). A fortiori, the Court 
should not infer departure from long-existing rules 
from congressional silence. 
 Petitioner’s position appears to be that estoppel is 
available but laches is not, and that estoppel is 
available even with respect to long-delayed actions 




separate-accrual rule. Pet. Br. 60-63. No plausible 
basis for that distinction appears. The Copyright Act 
mentions neither laches nor estoppel; if silence meant 
implied repeal, then both would be repealed with 
respect to copyright. At the very least, both would be 
repealed as a means of responding to long delay in 
filing a claim, lest they undermine the statute of 
limitations. The more sensible interpretation is that 
neither is repealed. Each is a longstanding 
background principle of judge-made law designed to 
deal with particular problems that can arise in 
copyright but are in no way specific to copyright. Each 
should presumptively apply unless Congress says 
otherwise. 
2. A Mistaken Inference from Legislative 
History 
 The concurring opinion below quoted one sentence 
of the Senate Report as follows: “[C]ourts generally do 
not permit the intervention of equitable defenses or 
estoppel where there is a [statute of] limitation on the 
right.” Pet. App. 24a (quoting S. Rep. 85-1014 
(bracketed insertion by Judge Fletcher)). The Senate 
Report was in turn quoting the House Report, H.R. 
Rep. 85-150 at 2.  
 Petitioner does not rely on this sentence, and 
appropriately so. It is very clear in context that this 
sentence was wholly inapplicable to the bill the 
committees were recommending. It described what 
the committees were trying to avoid, not what they 
were recommending. 
 The sentence came at the end of a substantial 
discussion of a distinction between statutes of 




limit plaintiff’s right. By this the committees meant 
the same distinction that this Court has sometimes 
described as ordinary statutes of limitations and 
jurisdictional statutes of limitations, Sebelius v. 
Auburn Regional Medical Center, 133 S. Ct. 817, 824 
(2013), or as ordinary statutes of limitations and those 
few that are “in such ‘emphatic form’ as to preclude 
equitable exceptions,” Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 
458 (2004) (quoting a brief).  
 Congress believed that limitations on the remedy 
were subject to equitable tolling and that limitations 
on the right were not. S. Rep. at 3 (quoting three 
paragraphs from H.R. Rep. at 2). And both reports 
were at pains to point out that the new statute of 
limitations for the Copyright Act was a limitation only 
on the remedy, not a limitation on the right. The 
sentence quoted by the concurring opinion below, 
about limitations on the right, was about what 
Congress was trying not to enact. And while the 
sentence referred to “equitable defenses” and to 
“estoppel,” the rules Congress was thinking about 
were tolling rules that extend the statute of 
limitations. These are not defenses but partial 
exceptions to the defense of limitations, and only some 
of them are equitable. 
 The committees’ reference to estoppel appears in 
context to have referred to plaintiffs arguing that 
defendants are estopped from asserting the statute of 
limitations,7 not to defendants arguing that plaintiffs 
                                                 
7 See, e.g., Glus v. Brooklyn Eastern District Terminal, 359 
U.S. 231 (1959) (defendant possibly estopped from asserting 
three-year statute of limitations because it assured plaintiff he 
had seven years to sue; whether it was reasonable to rely on that 




are estopped from asserting a long delayed claim. But 
whatever the committees meant by estoppel, they 
were not excluding its use. By emphasizing that they 
were enacting a limit on the remedy and not on the 
right, they meant that they were leaving uncodified 
background principles in place. 
 There is no indication in either committee report 
that Congress gave any attention to the continuing or 
repetitive nature of many copyright infringements, to 
the separate-accrual rule, or to laches. And there is 
certainly no modification of these background 
principles in statutory text. They should apply here. 
D. Laches or Estoppel Should Apply to Both 
Legal and Equitable Remedies Under the 
Copyright Act.  
  1. Remedies Under the Copyright Act 
 The Copyright Act provides for both legal and 
equitable remedies, and the reason for invoking 
laches or estoppel — the need to protect substantial 
and legitimate reliance — applies to legal as well as 
equitable remedies. An injunction under §502 is 
clearly equitable. Impoundment of infringing copies 
under §503 is administered by the judge, which 
suggests that it is viewed as equitable.8 
 Actual damages under §504(b) are clearly legal. 
Statutory damages under §504(c) are legal. Feltner v. 
                                                 
(5th Cir 1996) (defendant estopped from asserting limitations by 
its promise to pay plaintiff’s claim).. 
8 See 5 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on 
Copyright §1407[B][1] (Matthew Bender 2013) (treating the 





Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340 
(1998). It would make no sense for laches or estoppel 
to bar plaintiff’s claim for an injunction but not her 
claim for statutory damages in potentially crippling 
amounts, up to $150,000 per infringing copy. See 17 
U.S.C. §504(c)(2) (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
 Recovery of the profits of an intentional wrongdoer 
was historically available both at law, in quasi-
contract, and in equity, as accounting for profits.9 In 
the copyright context, this Court has treated recovery 
of defendant’s profits as equitable. Sheldon v. Metro-
Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U.S. 390, 399 (1940). 
Nineteenth-century courts appear to have viewed the 
recovery of profits as relief incidental to an 
injunction.10 This suggests both that the relief was 
granted in an equitable proceeding, and that it was 
thought that perhaps this relief could not be granted 
in equity if plaintiff did not also seek an injunction. In 
modern times, the lower courts have generally 
recognized a right to jury trial in suits to recover 
defendant’s profits, relying on Dairy Queen, Inc. v. 
Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962),11 thus implying that this 
relief is legal. But in Dairy Queen, the claimed 
accounting for profits was just a remedy on an 
underlying claim for breach of contract. This Court 
has not reviewed the jury-trial issue in the more 
common context of infringers who have no contract 
with the plaintiff. 
                                                 
9 See Restatement (Third), supra note 3, §4 and comments. 
10 2 Joseph Story, Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence 
§933 at 264 (4th ed., Little Brown 1846). 





 If the Court adheres to Sheldon’s view that 
recovery of the infringer’s profits is equitable, then 
laches plainly applies. But a plaintiff who sought to 
avoid the bar of laches by couching his claim for profits 
as legal, sounding in quasi-contract, would have a 
serious historical argument. (Petitioner asserts that 
all monetary remedies are legal, Pet. Br. 49-50, but 
she does not make the serious argument in support of 
that claim that she could have made.)  
 If the Court were to hold that recovery of profits 
under the Copyright Act is a legal remedy with 
historic roots in quasi-contract, it would make no 
sense for laches to bar an injunction against further 
sales but not a claim for all profits that defendant 
earned from infringing sales for the last three years 
or ever will earn forever into the future. In practical 
effect, these are equivalent remedies — an infringer 
will not sell the work if plaintiff will get all the profits 
— except that the injunction is more limited, because 
it does not reach three years into the past. 
  2. Estoppel 
 The simplest doctrinal solution to this problem is 
to turn to estoppel instead of laches. Estoppel 
undoubtedly applies to both legal and equitable 
claims. Pet. Br. 60-61. “The doctrine of equitable 
estoppel is, as its name indicates, chiefly, if not 
wholly, derived from courts of equity, and as these 
courts apply it to any species of property, there would 
seem no reason why its application should be 
restricted in courts of law.” Kirk v. Hamilton, 102 U.S. 
68, 78 (1880).12 
                                                 
12 See also T. Leigh Anenson, The Triumph of Equity: 




 The essence of estoppel is that one party is misled 
by the other and relies to his detriment. There are six-
part formulations,13 four-part formulations,14 three-
part formulations,15 and even one-sentence 
formulations,16 but all reduce to the same basic 
elements: misleading and detrimental reliance. 
  Laches and estoppel are not identical, but they 
are not nearly so different as Petitioner claims. 
“Estoppel is closely related to and sometimes identical 
with laches.”17 “When the basis for estoppel is conduct 
lulling the claimant into believing that an actor would 
not assert a right, claim, or defence, the actor may be 
estopped from asserting that right, claim, or 
defence.”18 
 What is essential here is that an estoppel can be 
based on a potential plaintiff’s silence or long delay in 
objecting when he knew, or should have known, that 
a potential defendant was acting in reliance on his 
apparent acquiescence. Kirk v. Hamilton, one of the 
                                                 
10 (2008) (reviewing cases and secondary authorities on 
longstanding availability of estoppel at law). 
13 Geddes v. Mill Creek Country Club, Inc., 751 N.E.2d 1150, 
1157 (Ill. 2001). 
14 Garbitelli v. Town of Brookfield, 987 A.2d 327, 331 (Vt. 
2009); Pet. App. 26a. 
15 Youngblood v. Auto-Owners Insurance Co., 158 P.3d 1088, 
1092 (Utah 2007). 
16 Plymouth Foam Products, Inc. v. City of Becker, 120 F.3d 
153, 156 (8th Cir. 1997). 
17 1 Dobbs, supra note 5, §2.3(5) at 89. 
18 Mark P. Gergen, Towards Understanding Equitable 
Estoppel, in Structure and Justification in Private Law 319, 333 




early cases committing this Court to the availability 
of estoppel at law, was a case of delay in asserting a 
claim to property, while the defendant expended 
substantial sums in improving that property. “He was 
silent when good faith required him to put the 
purchaser on guard,” and therefore estopped to assert 
his claim. 102 U.S. at 79. See also Board of Trade v. 
Johnson, 264 U.S. 1 (1924), a dispute over transfer of 
a seat on the Board of Trade, where the Court said: “If 
the transfer is completed before objection, those who 
have been silent are, of course, estopped.” Id. at 235. 
 There are more recent cases in the courts of 
appeals, including in copyright. “A copyright owner 
can be estopped not only by words and action but also 
by silence and inaction.” HGI Associates, Inc. v. 
Wetmore Printing Co., 427 F.3d 867, 875 (11th Cir. 
2005). “[E]stoppel may be accomplished by a plaintiff’s 
silence and inaction.” Carson v. Dynegy, Inc., 344 F.3d 
446, 453 (5th Cir. 2003). Estoppel is most like laches 
in cases like this one, where a potential plaintiff 
stands by and fails to assert a claim. “The emphasis 
in laches is on delay; the emphasis in estoppel is on 
misleading …. But the difference is attenuated when 
defendant is misled by plaintiff’s silence.”19 
 An intentional misrepresentation is not merely a 
basis for estoppel; it is fraud. For an estoppel, the 
misleading statement, conduct, silence, or delay may 
be intentionally deceitful, or merely negligent or 
inadvertent; in some contexts, it may be entirely 
                                                 





innocent.20 Estoppel is a flexible doctrine, fully 
adequate to the task of substituting for laches. 
 The eighteen-year delay in filing suit, and the 
doubtful justifications for that delay, on which the 
court of appeals relied to find unreasonable delay 
leading to laches, Pet. App. 9a-11a, are equally 
sufficient to lay the basis for estoppel. But neither 
defense is made out unless MGM shows sufficient 
reliance. And as stated above, we doubt that MGM has 
shown sufficient reliance to entirely bar the claim. 
  3. Laches 
 Laches is an equitable defense, developed in the 
first instance because statutes of limitation applied 
only at law. In some important classes of cases in 
equity — most notably, suits for breach of trust — the 
Chancellors did not apply the statute by analogy.21 
 Modern statutes of limitation often apply in 
equity, and they certainly apply to all remedies in 
copyright. If there is both a legal remedy and an 
equitable remedy for the same underlying legal 
wrong, the statute of limitations applies to both 
remedies. Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461, 463-64 
(1947) (“For it is only the scope of the relief sought and 
the multitude of parties sued which gives equity 
concurrent jurisdiction to enforce the legal obligation 
here asserted. And equity will withhold its relief in 
                                                 
20 Gergen, supra note 18, at 325-30 (surveying illustrative 
cases). Conversely, a party who would be unjustly enriched by 
reneging on an earlier representation may be estopped even with 
little in the way of reliance. Id. at 324. 
21 2 John Norton Pomeroy, A Treatise on Equity 




such a case where the applicable statute of limitations 
would bar the concurrent legal remedy.”). 
 That at least is the general rule, and the Copyright 
Act codifies that rule here. The statute of limitations 
in §507 says that “[n]o civil action” may be brought 
after three years; it does not distinguish the various 
remedies that may be sought in a “civil action.” 
 As Petitioner says, there is no doubt that laches 
historically applied only in equity. Pet. Br. 49-50. But 
that rule arose in a legal environment that was 
fundamentally different in some ways, and 
surprisingly similar in others. The historic 
understanding of laches as exclusively equitable arose 
when law and equity were administered in separate 
courts and statutes of limitations did not apply to 
important claims in equity.  
 Today, law and equity are administered in the 
same court, and all but the most basic points of the 
distinction are fading from legal memory. See Mertens 
v. Hewitt Associates, 508 U.S. 248, 256 (1993) 
(“memories of the divided bench, and familiarity with 
its technical refinements, recede further into the 
past”). The idea that equitable remedies are barred 
when legal remedies are not may be more quaint than 
functional.  
 Despite all the changes, the separate-accrual rule 
creates a situation much like that which faced the 
early Chancellors: if defendant continues to infringe, 
the statute of limitations may never run, and there is 
no way to take account of legitimate reliance interests 
without invoking laches or estoppel. 
 As already noted, the Court may respond to this 




But the Court could also say that at least in copyright, 
and presumably more generally, laches applies to both 
legal and equitable claims if it applies at all. Most of 
the other equitable defenses, including fraud, 
estoppel, and unconscionability, and near substitutes 
for unclean hands and even balancing the equities, 
have been fully assimilated to law.22 Laches could be 
assimilated as well. The Federal Circuit has already 
taken this step in patent cases. A.C. Aukerman Co. v. 
R.L. Chaides Construction Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1031 
(Fed. Cir. 1992) (en banc). 
 Of course it would make no sense to apply laches, 
before the applicable statute of limitations had 
expired, to bar a claim for damages arising from a 
single fixed event. It would make no sense even if 
important evidence had been lost in the meantime. 
The plaintiff in such a case is entitled to rely on the 
fixed period within which to file a claim. The plaintiffs’ 
bar does in fact rely; many claims are filed on or 
shortly before the last day permitted by the statute of 
limitations. 
 It is clear in this case that Petitioner did not rely 
on any fixed period in which she was permitted to file. 
If laches applies to Petitioner’s equitable claim for an 
injunction, it should also apply to her legal claim for 
damages and for statutory damages, and for 
defendant’s profits, no matter whether that claim is 
characterized as legal or equitable. 
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III. eBay v. MercExchange Casts No Light on 
This Case. 
 Petitioner suggests that any consideration of 
laches is inconsistent with eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, 
L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006). Pet. Br. 40-42. There are 
two problems with this argument. First, it is not a 
plausible interpretation of eBay. And second, the eBay 
formulation has miscommunicated, with serious 
unintended consequences. eBay should not be 
extended or built upon until it is clarified. 
A. eBay Does Not Preclude Consideration of 
Relevant Doctrines Not Mentioned in Its 
Four-Part Test. 
 eBay announced a four-part test for deciding 
whether to grant a permanent injunction: 
A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has 
suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that 
remedies available at law, such as monetary 
damages, are inadequate to compensate for 
that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of 
hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, 
a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that 
the public interest would not be disserved by a 
permanent injunction. 
Id. at 391. 
 Obviously this four-part test was not intended to 
be complete or to preempt all issues not mentioned in 
its single sentence.23 The test does not mention 
                                                 
23 See Mark P. Gergen, John M. Golden, & Henry E. Smith, 
The Supreme Court’s Accidental Revolution? The Test for 




success on the merits or the substantive rules 
applicable to plaintiff’s claim. It does not mention any 
affirmative defense available to defendant, equitable 
or otherwise. It does not mention laches, estoppel, or 
statute of limitations; it does not mention fraud, 
unclean hands, waiver, or accord and satisfaction. 
eBay was a patent case, but the Court did not mention 
infringement, validity, or any other issue going to 
liability.  
 If all these things are excluded from injunction 
cases because they were not mentioned in eBay, they 
are excluded not just in patent cases, not just in 
copyright cases, but in all injunction cases. eBay was 
not such a wholesale repealer. 
 The eBay test addresses the question whether a 
successful plaintiff should get an injunction or 
damages. It does not address whether a plaintiff is 
entitled to any remedy at all, or whether he should 
lose for failure to prove his case on liability or to 
overcome an affirmative defense.  
 In appropriate cases, laches or estoppel can 
entirely bar a plaintiff’s claim and preclude any 
remedy at all. In this case, laches or estoppel should 
preclude any remedy with respect to which MGM 
proves sufficient reliance. The application of laches or 
estoppel is simply not within the scope of eBay’s four-
part test. These defenses are outside that test.  
  
                                                 





B. The Four-Part Test in eBay Has Had 
Serious Unintended Consequences. 
  The four-part test in eBay has caused enormous 
disruption in the law of injunctions. Faced with rather 
wooden alternatives presented by the parties and the 
Federal Circuit, the Court invoked “traditional 
principles of equity” with little help from the parties. 
The Court believed that it was restating “traditional 
principles,” not making a substantial change. Chief 
Justice Roberts’s concurring opinion suggested that 
few results in patent cases would be changed. But that 
is not what happened. 
 The Court’s formulation somewhat misstated the 
principles on which it relied, and lower courts have 
read it to inadvertently discard a vast body of 
practical judicial experience that had generated 
useful presumptions about how the traditional 
principles of equity applied to recurring fact patterns. 
The test has had consequences in the lower courts 
that the Court almost certainly did not intend.24  
 That eBay can be invoked in good faith as 
Petitioner has invoked it here suggests that it may be 
even more disruptive than previously realized. The 
eBay test should not be extended or built upon, in this 
case or any other. There is no need to reconsider it 
here, because it is irrelevant here. But in an 
appropriate case, the eBay test should be reconsidered 
and clarified. 
 For permanent injunctions, there was no 
“traditional” four-part test on the lines the Court 
announced. Tests similar to the eBay test had 
                                                 




appeared in only a handful of cases. “Remedies 
scholars had never heard of the four-part test.”25 
 The Court appears to have been thinking of the 
four-part test for preliminary injunctions. The Court 
relied on two cases: Amoco Production Co. v. Village 
of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531 (1987), and Weinberger v. 
Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982). Amoco was 
unambiguously a preliminary injunction case. See 480 
U.S. at 534 (“the Ninth Circuit directed entry of a 
preliminary injunction”). Romero-Barcelo involved an 
injunction intended to last only until an 
administrative agency granted a permit. See 456 U.S. 
at 310 (“The Court of Appeals … remanded with 
instructions that the court order the Navy to cease the 
violation until it obtained a permit.”). The case had 
been fully tried below,26 so in a sense this was to be a 
short-lived “permanent” injunction, but it is 
impossible to learn that from this Court’s opinion. 
These are the two cases the Court relied on in eBay.  
 In some ways, this Court treated the injunction in 
Romero-Barcelo as though it were preliminary. The 
Court quoted rules about “an interlocutory 
injunction.” 456 U.S. at 312. It said that the district 
court, which had refused an injunction, had 
“temporarily, not permanently, allowed the Navy to 
continue its activity without a permit.” Id. at 315. It 
referred to the issues “at this stage of the 
                                                 
25 Doug Rendleman, The Trial Judge’s Equitable Discretion 
Following eBay v. MercExchange, 27 Rev. Litig. 63, 76 n.71 
(2007). 
26 See Romero-Barcelo v. Brown, 643 F.2d 835, 836 (1st Cir. 
1981) (“[a]fter an extensive trial”); Romero-Barcelo v. Brown, 478 
F. Supp. 646, 652 (D.P.R. 1979) (“The Court consolidated the 




proceedings,” id. at 320, and it said that if the permit 
were not forthcoming, the district court would have to 
reconsider its decision, id. On the other hand, the 
Court did not mention probable success on the merits. 
 The familiar four-part test for preliminary 
injunctions takes account of probable success on the 
merits, irreparable injury, balance of hardships, and 
the public interest. See, e.g., Winter v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008) 
(citing Amoco and Romero-Barcelo). There has been 
some variation in the stated relationship among these 
four parts,27 but the four parts are a fixture in the law. 
 It would make no sense to say that a permanent 
injunction depends on probable success on the merits; 
by the permanent injunction stage, the plaintiff has 
already succeeded. The Court got back to four parts by 
separating irreparable injury and adequate remedy at 
law into two elements of the test. But with respect to 
remedies, these are just two names for the same thing. 
                                                 
27 Winter can be read to say that these four points are 
separate elements that plaintiff “must establish.” 555 U.S. at 20. 
Other cases speak in terms of balancing the four factors. See, e.g., 
Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 433 (2009) (stay of administrative 
order is “an exercise of discretion” and “dependent on the 
circumstances of the particular case”); Amoco, 480 U.S. at 542 
(“court must balance the competing claims of injury and must 
consider the effect on each party of the granting or withholding 
of the requested relief.”); Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway, 279 U.S. 813, 
814 (1929) (stating a consolidated query based on the degree to 
which each of the four factors is present). See also Ashcroft v. 
ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 670 (2004) (discussing “important practical 
reasons” for a preliminary injunction, which implies an all-




What makes an injury irreparable is precisely that no 
legal remedy can repair it.28  
 Perhaps to create some distinction between the 
first two elements of its test, the Court put irreparable 
injury in the past tense (“has suffered”), and adequate 
remedy at law in the present tense (“are inadequate”). 
But “has suffered” irreparable injury cannot be taken 
literally; it would eliminate the well-settled principle 
that injunctions are available to prevent irreparable 
injury that is imminently or certainly threatened. 
“One does not have to await the consummation of 
threatened injury to obtain preventive relief.” Farmer 
v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 845 (1994) (quoting 
Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 593 
(1923)). See also Winter, 555 U.S. at 20 (at 
preliminary injunction stage, plaintiff must show 
“that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm”) 
(emphasis added). 
 There is a more fundamental problem with copying 
the test for preliminary injunctions and applying it 
without further explanation to permanent 
injunctions. Although some of the phrases are the 
same, their meaning is very different. At the 
permanent injunction stage, the plaintiff has proved 
his case and won on the merits; at the preliminary 
injunction stage, he has done neither. This is a 
distinction of fundamental importance.  
 Courts at the preliminary relief stage routinely 
find that damages will be an adequate remedy for 
                                                 
28 See 1 Dobbs, supra note 5, §2.5(1) at 124-25; James M. 
Fischer, Understanding Remedies §21.1 at 201-02 (2d ed., 
Matthew Bender 2006); Laycock, supra note 19, at 380-81; 




injuries they would consider irreparable after a full 
trial.29 At the permanent injunction stage, the 
irreparable injury rule is rather easily satisfied30 — 
unless on the particular facts the injunction raises 
some difficulty, and then it is that difficulty, rather 
than the adequacy of legal remedies, that makes the 
injunction unavailable.31 For a permanent injunction 
to be precluded by an adequate legal remedy, without 
more, “the legal remedy must be as complete, 
practical, and efficient as that which equity could 
afford.” Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 214 
(1923).32 
 The balance of hardships varies in similar ways. 
At the preliminary injunction stage, harm to each side 
is sensibly balanced in light of the probability of 
success; hardship counts for more if it is probably 
unlawful and undeserved. Courts speak of the balance 
of hardships “tipping” one way or the other. See, e.g., 
Winter, 555 U.S. at 26 (‘the balance of equities and 
consideration of the overall public interest in this case 
tip strongly in favor of the Navy.”). 
                                                 
29 See Douglas Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury 
Rule 111-17 (Oxford 1991) (collecting and analyzing examples). 
See also 1 Dobbs, supra note 5, §2.11(2) at 253 (explaining that 
the test differs at the two stages because “[i]n preliminary relief 
cases the irreparable harm requirement serves a special purpose; 
it provides a barrier against the easy use of public power without 
a trial.”); Fischer, supra note 28, §33.2 at 299-300 (elaborating 
the differences between the two stages). 
30 See Laycock, supra note 29, at 37-98. 
31 See id. at 133-236. 




 But at the permanent injunction stage, plaintiff 
has proved his case and defendant is an adjudicated 
wrongdoer. Hardship to defendant is a defense only if 
it is greatly disproportionate to the hardship to 
plaintiff of denying an injunction. “Where substantial 
redress can be afforded by the payment of money and 
issuance of an injunction would subject the defendant 
to grossly disproportionate hardship, equitable relief 
may be denied although the nuisance is indisputable.” 
City of Harrisonville v. W.S. Dickey Clay 
Manufacturing Co., 289 U.S. 334, 338 (1933) 
(emphasis added).33  
 Because such disproportionate hardship arises 
only occasionally, undue hardship at the permanent 
injunction stage is better thought of as a defense to be 
raised and proved by defendant than as something 
plaintiff must disprove in every injunction case.34 
Similarly with the public interest: a public interest 
distinct from the interests of the parties can be very 
important when it is present, but such interests arise 
                                                 
33 See generally Douglas Laycock, The Neglected Defense of 
Undue Hardship (and the Doctrinal Train Wreck in Boomer v. 
Atlantic Cement), 4 J. Tort Law, Issue 3, Article 3 (2012), 
available at http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/jtl.2011.4.issue-
3/issue-files/jtl.2011.4.issue-3.xml; Fischer, supra note 28, 
§31.2.3 at 265 (contrasting balance of hardships at the two 
stages). 
34 See Laycock, supra note 33 (characterizing undue hardship 
as a defense); Gergen, Golden, & Smith, supra note 23, at 227 
(“Notably, when balance-of-hardships concerns enter through 
the undue-hardship defense, the right violator bears a 
considerable burden of production from the start, a situation that 
contrasts with that under an eBay test unsupplemented by any 




only occasionally, and plaintiffs should not have to 
raise the issue and address it in every case. 
 The lower courts in eBay had applied 
presumptions that this Court rejected. The district 
court’s presumption against injunctions in favor of 
non-practicing patent holders had little basis in law; 
the Federal Circuit’s presumption in favor of enjoining 
patent infringement had ample basis but was stated 
too rigidly. This Court rejected both presumptions, 
and the lower courts have read the opinion to reject 
all presumptions.35 
 This interpretation has thrown out the baby with 
the bathwater. The “traditional principles of equity” 
have long recognized patterns in the cases, and these 
patterns have given rise to rebuttable presumptions. 
Justice Story’s chapter on injunctions is full of fact 
patterns and classes of cases in which injunctions 
would normally be granted or withheld.36 These are 
the “traditional principles of equity;” Justice Story did 
not just identify eBay’s four very general principles 
and say they must be applied case by case. One of 
these amici has surveyed the modern cases, 
identifying similar patterns and classes of cases in 
which injunctions will generally be granted37 or 
withheld.38 Repeated or continuing violations of law 
generally give rise to irreparable injury; the 
application of this principle to intellectual property 
                                                 
35 See Gergen, Golden, & Smith, supra note 23, at 215-19 
(collecting cases). 
36 See 2 Story, supra note 10, §§871-959 at 206-92. 
37 See Laycock, supra note 29, at 37-98. 




was well-settled in Justice Story’s time.39 
Constitutional violations generally give rise to 
irreparable injury; a simple breach of contract often 
does not, so a plaintiff seeking specific performance 
has to explain and prove why damages are 
inadequate. And so on. 
 Rules of thumb such as these give guidance to the 
parties and simplify the work of courts. To abolish all 
this practical learning at one fell swoop is seriously 
harmful and surely not what the Court intended. See 
eBay, 547 U.S. at 394 (“We hold only that the decision 
whether to grant or deny injunctive relief rests within 
the equitable discretion of the district courts, and that 
such discretion must be exercised consistent with 
traditional principles of equity ….” (emphasis added)); 
id. at 395 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (“[T]here is a 
difference between exercising equitable discretion … 
and writing on an entirely clean slate.”).  
 eBay’s formulation of the standards for injunctive 
relief requires modification; at the very least, it 
requires substantial clarification. The Court should 
not compound the damage here by accepting 
Petitioner’s invitation to suggest that all law not 
mentioned in eBay’s four-part test is henceforth 
irrelevant to injunction cases. 
  
                                                 





 The judgment should be vacated and the case 
remanded for a much more particularized 
consideration of laches and estoppel consistent with 
this Court’s opinion. 
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